Financial Intermediation and the Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market by Richard C. Green et al.
Financial Intermediation and the
Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market
Richard C. GREEN
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University
Burton HOLLIFIELD
Norman SCHÜRHOFF
HEC, University of Lausanne and FAME
Research Paper N° 130
Feburary 2005
FAME - International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering
THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
40, Bd. du Pont dÕArve
PO Box, 1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland 
Tel  +41(0)22 312 09 61  
Fax +41(0)22 312 10 26
www.fame.ch 
admin@fame.ch

















Municipal bonds trade in opaque, decentralized broker-dealer markets in which price information is costly to 
gather. Whether dealers in such a market operate competitively is an empirical issue, but a difficult one to study. 
Data in such markets is generally not centrally recorded. We analyze a comprehensive database of all trades 
between broker-dealers in municipal bonds and their customers. The data is only released to the public with a 
substantial lag, and thus the market was relatively opaque to the traders themselves during our sample period. 
We find that dealers earn lower average markups on larger trades, even though larger trades lead the dealers to 
bear more risk of losses. We formulate and estimate a simple structural bargaining model that allows us to 
estimate measures of dealer bargaining power and relate it to characteristics of the trades. The results suggest 
dealers exercise substantial market power. Our measures of market power decrease in trade size and increase in 
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There is a long-standing debate among regulators, researchers, and practitioners about the costs and beneﬁts of cen-
tralization and transparency in ﬁnancial markets. Fragmentation and lack of transparency may create opportunities
for intermediaries to develop and exploit local monopoly power. Centralization may avoid such monopoly power
locally, but it may also stiﬂe innovation and entrench intermediaries.
A signiﬁcant diﬃculty in resolving these questions is that, almost by construction, it is diﬃcult to obtain
transactions-based data in markets that are fragmented and opaque. Most empirical studies of the costs of trading
have been in settings where trading is relatively centralized and price information is readily available to buyers and
sellers.
We analyze a database that allows us to observe the trading of broker-dealer intermediaries in the municipal bond
market. We develop a simple theoretical model that decomposes dealer gains on a trade into the cost of facilitating
the trade, a zero-mean forecast error, and a measure of the dealer’s bargaining advantage or market power. Our
estimates of the model produce measures of dealer market power and show how it varies with the type of trade.
Our analysis thus contributes to a better understanding of the consequences of fragmentation and transparency by
measuring the risks and rewards earned by intermediaries in an opaque and fragmented market of the sort that has
so far been the most diﬃcult to study.
The market for municipal bonds in the U.S. is a large and important ﬁnancial market by any measure. Aggregate
municipal bond holdings currently amount to roughly $1.75 trillion.
1 New issues in recent years have averaged close
to $300 billion per year. Along with its size, the municipal market is also remarkable for its fragmentary nature and
lack of transparency. These characteristics are attributable to several factors.
First, there are many relatively small issuers of municipal bonds. In recent years there have been between ten and
ﬁfteen thousand separate municipal bond issues per year. In 2001 the average issue size was $21 million.
2 Municipal
bonds are typically issued in series and each issue in turn is likely to consist of 10-30 separate bonds with diﬀerent
maturities. Second, since municipals are tax-exempt, they are in large measure held by individual retail investors
(35% in 2001), insurance companies (10%), or in bank and personal trusts (6.5%). Municipal bonds are therefore
unlikely to trade frequently.
Third, municipals are traded in decentralized broker-dealer markets. There is no centralized exchange, and to
obtain quotes a buyer or seller must call multiple dealers or solicit bids from them. The lack of a centralized exchange
makes comparison shopping relatively costly. Fourth, many states only exempt their own municipalities’ bonds from
state income tax, further contributing to local segmentation. Finally, for political reasons, or because of local cost
advantages, smaller regional ﬁrms underwrite many municipal issues. The lack of a large intermediary with access to
many diﬀerent bonds may further increase the costs of eﬃciently matching buyers and sellers.
The size of spreads in the municipal market has attracted the attention of regulators, the press, and the in-
1The source of these aggregate statistics on the municipal market is The Bond Market Association
(http://www.bondmarkets.com).
2Data on the number of underwritings is available at http://www.ﬁnancialservicesfacts.org.
1vesting public in the last few years. Many argue that the spreads are unreasonably high. A popular web site
(www.MunicipalBonds.com) lists the “Worst Ten Spreads” for trades in various categories, along with “Red Flags”
and “Worst Spread Reports” based on Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) reports. MSRB rules require
that trades with customers should only be executed at prices that are “fair and reasonable, taking into consideration
all relevant factors.” Both NASD and the SEC have examined speciﬁc cases and complaints concerning municipal
bond trades. The diﬃculty for researchers and policy makers lies in identifying “all relevant factors” and quantifying
when variation attributable to those factors is “fair and reasonable.”
The SEC ruled that markups on trades ranging from 1.42% to 5% “substantially exceeded accepted industry
practice,” while NASD stated that transactions with spreads between 7% and 27% were not “fair and reasonable.”
3
Such blanket rules, because they ignore the variation in costs of ﬁnancial intermediation, will necessarily be conser-
vative and identify only extreme cases. Our structural model allows us to disentangle competitive compensation for
the costs of intermediating trades from the exercise of market power.
Our sample was gathered by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) as a ﬁrst step in their eﬀorts to
move municipal bond trading towards a more transparent system. The sample records every transaction in municipal
bonds by registered broker-dealers between May 1, 2000 and January 10, 2004. The sample contains a large number
of transactions—over 26 million trades—covering a longer time than in a typical microstructure, transactions-based
sample.
These data are only made public after a time lag. Initially the lag was one day for bonds that traded more
than four times during the day, and one month for all other trades. Over the sample period the time lag has been
shortened, and the scope of the daily reports have been increased in several steps. The change in the time lags
provides a natural experiment in the consequences of increased transparency.
The sample does not identify the speciﬁc broker-dealer associated with a given trade, but does record whether
the transaction was between dealers, or between a dealer and a customer. We can measure the markups implicit in
transaction prices between dealers, in aggregate, and their customers, and study the determinants of the markups,
such as the price concessions to quantity.
Since we cannot directly link individual trades to speciﬁc dealers, we must infer their trades and proﬁts indirectly.
For example, we study pairs of trades that appear to be direct exchanges of bonds through a dealer: the same par value
of the same bond is purchased from a customer and then sold to a customer in a very short time. Alternatively, we
consider more generous ﬁlters, such as purchases by a dealer followed by a sequence of sales to customers or interdealer
trades that return dealer inventories to their original level. Because the individual bonds trade infrequently, we can
be reasonably conﬁdent that these trades are associated with the same original block of bonds.
Empirical methods alone are of limited use in identifying that portion of dealer proﬁts due to market power.
We therefore develop a simple theoretical model of the interaction between dealers and their customers in which the
expected proﬁts to the dealer reﬂect both the dealer’s costs and his bargaining power relative to the customer. Both
3See “Regulators Know What Bond Dealers Did Last Summer,” by Joe Mysak, Bloomberg News Service, September
3, 2003, “Munis: What’s a Fair Price?” by Dean Foust, Business Week, July 7, 2003, and SEC “Opinion of the
Commission,” Admin. Proc. File No. 3-9499.
2of these, in turn, can be parameterized as functions of observable variables, and estimated as a Stochastic Frontier
Model. The dealer’s cost is the stochastic frontier, which represents the expected markup the customer would obtain
if dealers were always driven to their reservation values, as they would be if the provision of dealer services were
perfectly competitive. The observed markup diﬀers from dealer costs by a zero-mean forecast error and a one-sided
error. The one-sided error reﬂects the distribution of sellers’ reservation values and dealer bargaining power.
Our empirical results suggest dealer costs depend on liquidity measures for the bond and market, the size of
the trade, interest rate conditions, and how the trade is processed. The portion of average proﬁts attributed by
the estimates to the dealers’ advantage in bargaining power is substantially higher than the portion attributed
to the actual cost of intermediating the trades. The dealers’ market power is highest for small to medium sized
transactions. Such transactions are presumably with less sophisticated retail investors: a ﬁnding consistent with the
theoretical arguments in Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu and Pedersen (2004) that less sophisticated investors face higher markups
in a bargaining market. The market power of dealers as a group is also higher in situations where more extensive
intermediation is required, such as when the trade moves through other dealers, spends more time in inventory, or is
broken up into smaller blocks.
The lack of centralized recording and preservation of price information has limited the study of trading costs
in bond markets. Exceptions are studies by Hong and Warga (2000), Schultz (2001), and Chakravarty and Sarkar
(1999). These authors all study a sample of trades executed on behalf of large insurance companies. Their data
identify the institutions and dealers participating in the trade, and whether it was a buy or a sell. The authors
use various techniques to estimate the bid-ask spread implicit in the observed trades, and then relate the measured
trading costs to characteristics of the bonds and the current market conditions. Of these studies, only Chakravarty
and Sarkar (1999) include municipal bonds in their analysis.
Our sample diﬀers from that used in the previous studies in several respects. First, it is comprehensive. It
includes all trades by registered broker-dealers in municipal securities, rather than those trades initiated by a subset
of institutional investors. We have data on over 26 million transactions in over one million bonds issued by over 46
thousand entities. Our data do not identify dealers or buyers speciﬁcally. They only tell us whether a trade was a
buy from a customer, a sell to a customer, or a trade between dealers. Thus, we can measure the aggregate ﬂow of
bonds to and from the dealers as a group, and the turnover of bonds within that group, but we cannot relate trading
costs to the individual characteristics of the buyer or seller. The information in our data about the characteristics of
the bonds is limited, and given the huge number of diﬀerent bonds we have been unable to gather additional data on
speciﬁc attributes of the bonds for the whole sample.
The paper closest to our work is Harris and Piwowar (2004). They estimate trading costs for municipal bonds
using the MSRB data, though over a shorter time period. Their approach is very diﬀerent from ours, reﬂecting
diﬀerences in goals. The two papers share an interest in measuring how large the costs of trading in this market are,
and understanding how these costs vary with the size and other characteristics of the trade. The papers also share a
central diﬃculty: while there are many trades in many bonds, trading in any one bond is typically very infrequent.
Harris and Piwowar (2004) estimate a time-series model of the trading cost for each bond with a minimal number of
3trades during the sample period, augmented with a factor model that uses bond market indices to infer movements
in the intrinsic value of the bonds between observed trades, which may be months apart. They then analyze how
the estimated costs vary cross-sectionally for diﬀerent types of bonds. We focus on trades that can reasonably be
assumed to represent two sides of a single intermediated transaction, and employ a structural model to decompose
the cost faced by a customer into a portion that represents the cost the dealer incurs and a portion attributable to
the dealer’s market power.
These very diﬀerent approaches produce roughly similar estimates of average costs of trading, and both make
clear that smaller trades are much more costly than large ones. The Harris and Piwowar (2004) results provide
a richer description of how the costs vary with bond characteristics such as credit quality. That paper is purely
empirical in its goals, however. Our paper uses a theoretical model to seek evidence that the high costs of trading are
due to dealer market power and to ﬁnd out how the exercise of market power depends on the characteristics of the
trade. The presence of market power, and the way dealers use it, are central policy and research concerns in markets
that lack transparency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the institutional setting and our
sample. In Section 3 we study dealer proﬁts on round-trip transactions, and illustrate their dependence on size and
other characteristics of the trade. In Section 4 we present a structural model that allows us to decompose the proﬁts
into portions attributable to dealer costs and market power. We report our empirical estimates in Section 5, and
report estimates of the eﬀects of changes in market transparency in Section 6. The ﬁnal section concludes. The
Appendix contains detailed descriptions of procedures we used to ﬁlter the data and variable deﬁnitions.
2 The Municipal Bond Market and the Sample
We have a sample from the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) reporting all trades carried out by
broker-dealers from May 1, 2000 through January 10, 2004. The sample was gathered as part of the MSRB’s eﬀorts
to improve transparency in the municipal bond market, and will eventually be incorporated into a system that
makes transactions prices publicly available to market participants. The sample is self-reported, and there are many
systematic errors made in entering the data, especially early in the sample period when member ﬁrms were still
becoming accustomed to the system. In the Appendix we describe in detail the procedures we use to identify and
ﬁlter out data errors.
The transaction-speciﬁc information provided about each trade include the price, the date and time of the trade,
the par value traded, whether the trade was a dealer buying from a customer, a dealer selling to a customer, or a trade
between dealers. There are ﬁelds for the yield at which the trade took place, which is not required but is sometimes
reported. Information is also provided about the traded bond including the CUSIP number, a text description of the
bond, the date interest begins accruing (the “dated date”), the coupon rate, and the bond’s maturity. Often some
of the ﬁelds are empty, but by searching other trades for the CUSIP number we can generally determine the missing
information. For example, we calculate measures of age and maturity for the bonds in each of over 26 million trades
4in the sample.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. The ﬁrst panel includes all transactions in the data. The second panel
describes trades occurring in the ﬁrst ninety days after the dated date for bonds that are issued during our sample
period.
4 We refer to such trades as “new issues.”
Sales to customers exceed buys from customers, primarily because of activity in new issues. Syndicates of broker-
dealers purchase new bond issues, and the resulting inventory is distributed to customers primarily during the ﬁrst
ninety days. The dollar value of trades in newly issued bonds is $3.697 trillion, only 32% of the total value of all
trades. The diﬀerence between the value of sales to customers and buys from customers for newly issued bonds,
$1.689 trillion, is 90% of the corresponding diﬀerence for all trades, even though transactions in new issues are less
than a third of all transactions.
The value of sales to customers are approximately equal to buys from customers in seasoned issues. The broker-
dealers tend to buy bonds from customers in larger par amounts, and then sell the bonds in smaller blocks. The
average purchase from a customer is close to four times larger than the average sale to a customer for new issues,
and a bit less than three times the corresponding transaction size for seasoned issues. Inter-dealer trades are of
intermediate size.
Municipal bonds are actively traded in a “when issued” market, and also immediately after they are issued.
Once the bonds ﬁnd their way into retail and mutual fund portfolios, the volume of trade drops oﬀ dramatically. The
MSRB reports that from March 1998 to May 1999, 71% of the outstanding issues did not trade at all. Such patterns
are very apparent in Figure 1, where we plot the empirical probability of trade as a function of the age of the bond.
Four to six months from issuance, less than 10% of the bonds in our sample trade at all. The probability then rises
somewhat so that by four years from issuance, roughly 15% of the bonds in the sample trade at least once during a
month.
Figure 2 shows the average number of trades per day, conditional on the bond trading on that day. After the bond
is reasonably seasoned, the average number of trades stays close to two, suggesting that trades through broker-dealers
in a given bond are typically limited to the intermediation of a speciﬁc transaction.
Our empirical tests in subsequent sections focus on liquidity provision for seasoned bonds—bonds more than
90 days from issuance—because volume has typically stabilized for seasoned bonds. The value of purchases from
customers roughly equal sales for seasoned bonds. Because we see both sides of most transactions in seasoned bonds,
we can reliably measure the proﬁtability of the ﬂows to the dealers for transactions in seasoned bonds. Our results
are, therefore, most informative about the typical experience of an individual or institution holding bonds who wants
to sell them, and thus demands liquidity.
4For its monthly trade summaries, the MSRB deﬁnes “new issue trades” as “trades where the diﬀerence between
the trade date and the dated date is less than or equal to 4 weeks (28 days).” We chose a longer time horizon, since
our data suggests that transaction volume has not yet ﬂattened out one month after issuance. Substantial transaction
volume in new issues through the when-issued market starts as early as 20 days before the dated date.
53 The Magnitude and Characteristics of Dealer Markups
Liquidity in the market for seasoned municipal bonds is typically supplied by broker-dealers who purchase large
blocks of bonds from customers and then resell the bonds, either in a block or split into smaller trades. From May 1,
2000 to January 10, 2004, a total of 5,313,692 purchases from customers occurred in seasoned municipal bond issues.
Our data do not identify matched buy-sell transactions for speciﬁc bonds, nor the speciﬁc dealers carrying
out those transactions. We observe bonds ﬂowing into and out of the hands of dealers as a group. In many
cases, however, the sequence of transactions in a given bond issue leave little doubt that they are two ends of a
transaction intermediated by a speciﬁc dealer. We focus on three methods for measuring the proﬁts to dealers
from the transactions. The narrowest measure isolates transactions that are most obviously two sides of the same
transaction. The broader measures capture more trades, and thus can be viewed as more representative of the proﬁts
dealers earn as a group.
First, we study trades where a buy from a customer is followed by a sale to a customer in the same bond for the
same par amount on the same day with no intervening trades in that bond. We refer to such trades as “immediate
matches.” For immediate matches, no added inventory is carried on the books of the dealers at the end of the day.
Of course, some of the immediate matches may be situations where the initial purchase is by one intermediary,
the subsequent sale is by another, and it is purely coincidence that the par value of the trades is identical. The
information from the previous section about the frequency of trade, however, suggests such events are quite unlikely,
particularly when the time between the two trades is short. As is apparent from Figure 2, the mean number of trades
per day, conditional on a bond trading once, is close to two. If, in a short period of time, we know one of these trades
is a buy, the other is a sale, and they both involve the same par value, it is very likely that they are two sides of a
trade intermediated by a single dealer.
Second, we consider a broader set of transactions where buys from customers are followed by transactions that
clear dealer inventories in aggregate. In each case, a buy from a customer is followed by one or more sales to customers
equal in par value to the initial purchase with no intervening purchases from customers. The purchases and sales
may be spread out through time, and there may be intermediate trades between dealers in the bond. The proﬁts
earned on such transactions represent rewards to the dealers as a group for the intermediation they provide. We refer
to such transactions as “round-trip transactions.”
The largest set of transactions we study, or the “FIFO sample,” consists of the broad sample of round-trip
transactions augmented by all the purchases from customers that over our sample period could be matched with sales
to customers using a ﬁrst-in-ﬁrst-out (FIFO) rule. For the FIFO sample, there may be intervening purchases from
customers, but unless those purchases are selected by the round-trip criteria, the ﬁrst sales are assigned to the bonds
that came into dealer inventories ﬁrst. The FIFO sample, then, is most likely to assign sales to purchases made by
another dealer, but will be more representative of proﬁts to the dealers as a group. This broadest matching procedure
covers 86% of the purchases from customers in our database. The Appendix and Table 2 provide more details on the
matching procedures used to construct the round-trip and FIFO samples.
Table 4 describes the three samples. Panel (a) reports medians of the measured proﬁts on the trades and some
6of the explanatory variables associated with the trades that we use in subsequent analyses. The “Gross Markup” is
the dealer gain or loss on the trades as a percentage of the purchase price. The “Net Markup” adjusts the markup
for yield curve movements. For this purpose, we have obtained data for the Lehman Brothers Municipal Bond Index
for various maturities (1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 22+ years) from Datastream. We use a linear spline to interpolate values
for other maturities. To arrive at the net holding-period proﬁts, we subtract the maturity-matched price change of
the corresponding municipal bond index from the gross markup. We truncate the resulting distribution at the 0.5%
and 99.5% quantiles, since there are some very extreme observations that appear to have been the result of clerical
errors when the data was entered. Details on the deﬁnitions of the various explanatory variables are in Table 3.
Table 4 shows median markups are between 1.3% and 1.9%. The table also shows that median yields on municipal
bonds are less than 5% in our sample — selling a bond therefore involves surrendering much of a year’s return on a
municipal bond.
The sample of round-trip transactions involves about half the purchases from customers. Since there can be no
new purchases between the initial transaction and the sale of the same par value, the bonds in the round-trip sample
trade less frequently than the immediate matches (14% of all purchases from customers) or the FIFO sample (86%
of all purchases from customers). Not surprisingly, perhaps, the measured markups are also larger for the round-trip
transactions.
The two stricter criteria—the immediate matches and round trip transactions—select trades involving lower par
amounts, smaller issues, and bonds where daily volume in bonds from the same state was lower. From the narrowest
sample (the immediate matches) to the broadest sample, (the FIFO sample), the time before the purchases clears
from inventory rises from 0.031 days to 3.107 days. Other characteristics of the samples are reasonably similar, or do
not vary in ways suggesting obvious biases.
Panel (b) of Table 4 shows estimates of the time before bonds purchased in a block clear dealer inventories for
the two broader sample criteria: the round-trip transactions and the FIFO sample. Over half of the purchases from
customers are sold within ﬁve business days. But the dealers as a group do appear to bear substantial risk of ending
up holding bonds for long periods when they supply liquidity. The extent to which holding bonds for long periods is
costly for the dealers is unclear, however, since the bonds pay competitive returns.
5
Table 5 provides information from the FIFO sample about the markups the dealers earn, the frequency of losses,
and how trades are processed. We only report this information for the FIFO sample, but similar patters are very
evident for the narrower sample deﬁnitions and for shorter time periods. For larger trades of over $100,000 par value,
just over 40% are resold in a single block. For retail-sized transactions of less than $100,000 in par value, over 60%
are resold in a single block. Panel (b) reports statistics describing the percentage markup for trades of diﬀerent
sizes and processed in diﬀerent ways. Trades are categorized by whether the initial purchase is sold oﬀ in smaller
blocks (“Split” versus “No Split”) and by whether the bonds are traded between dealers before being sold oﬀ to
5For the dealers, the coupon income in municipal bonds is tax-exempt, and capital gains are taxed on an accrual
basis. At the short-end of the term structure, municipal bonds have similar after-tax yields to treasuries, and at
longer maturities, municipal bonds tend to have higher after-tax yields than treasuries. See, for example, Green
(1993).
7customers (“Interdealer” versus “No Interdealer”). Columns in the table divide the trades according to the par value
of the initial purchase in millions. Regardless of how the trade is processed, average markups fall as the size of the
trade increases, as does the standard deviation of the realized markups. Markups are economically insigniﬁcant for
institutionally sized trades of over $500,000, if the bonds are resold in a single block.
Within any size category, proﬁts to dealers as a group are higher for trades that require more extensive or
elaborate intermediation in the sense that a large number of counterparties are involved in selling oﬀ the bonds.
Trades that involve a large number of counterparties appear to be riskier than trades that involve a few number of
counterparties—dealer proﬁts have higher standard deviations if the trades involve a large number of counterparties.
But the causality between proﬁts, risk, and number of counterparties is ambiguous, since the means of selling oﬀ
the bonds is an endogenous choice of the dealers. For example, dealers may involve more counterparties when they
anticipate more diﬃculties clearing their inventory ex-ante, or they may involve more counterparties ex-post, when
market conditions have turned against them and they become more desperate to sell. The positive association between
proﬁtability, and both the risk and number of counter parties suggests that dealers involve more counterparties when
they anticipate more diﬃculties clearing their inventories ex-ante.
Overall, the evidence in Panel (b) of Table 5 seems consistent with dealer markups being determined by the
risks and costs dealers bear, rather than market power. There are likely economies of scale in handling trades, and
percentage markups fall with trade size. More service is provided by the intermediaries when more counterparts are
involved, and larger markups are evident for these trades. Types of trades with higher average markups also have
higher standard deviation. There is an evident association between risk and return.
Nevertheless, there is also evidence in Table 5 that bargaining power is tilted towards larger trades. While risk,
as measured by standard deviation, is higher for smaller trades, dealers rarely lose money on them. Panel (c) reports
loss frequencies for the various categories of trades. Dealer losses are most frequent for the categories of trades on
which markups are the least variable. There is a high level of skewness in the markups for all trade categories, and
for large trades the distribution is simultaneously more concentrated and centered at a lower level.
The skewness is evident in Figure 3 showing the frequency distributions for three diﬀerent trade-size categories
for the FIFO sample. The plots, which all have the same scale, are kernel density estimates. The estimates are
computed using the Epanechnikov kernel with the Silverman automatic bandwidth selection method.
6 It is obvious
from the plots that the higher loss frequencies for large trades are not the result of the realized percentage proﬁts
being more spread out. Their distribution is much more concentrated, but centered at a much lower point.
The combination of these three characteristics—lower percentage proﬁts, higher probability of losses, and less
variable proﬁts—suggests the largest traders transact with the dealers on more attractive terms. The next section,
which reports estimates of parameters that summarize dealer market power, provides some additional evidence along
these lines.
Figure 3 also provides some evidence on how pervasive extremely high markups are for trades of diﬀerent sizes.
On relatively small transactions, a substantial portion of the distribution of realized spreads exceed 5% (the NASD’s
6H¨ ardle (1990) provides a textbook introduction to kernel smoothing methods.
8“cap” for equity trades), while very few trades occur at spreads in excess of 8%. Except for the very largest trades,
there is considerable probability mass above 2%. In summary, relative to the norms of fairness and reasonableness
cited in SEC opinions and NASD complaints, there are substantial numbers of trades that occur at high spreads,
but the extremely high spreads in the range of 20-50% reported in the press are likely to be data errors or extremely
unusual events.
4 Dealer Market Power and Transaction Size
In the previous section we established that the markups dealers earn on round-trip transactions are large. They diﬀer
in magnitude and variability across trades with diﬀerent characteristics. To what extent is this evidence that dealers
exercise market power in their interaction with certain classes of customers, versus evidence that the costs and risks
of intermediating the trades diﬀer with these characteristics?
In this section we speak to the question by developing a simple model that decomposes the observed markup
into components associated with the cost to the dealer and the dealer’s relative bargaining power with the customer.
We then estimate the model as a Stochastic Frontier Model.
4.1 The Model
Consider transactions between a dealer and a customer currently holding bonds she wishes to sell. Customers buying
municipal bonds typically have many substitutes for any particular issue. Most round-trip transactions in seasoned
municipal bonds are therefore initiated by customers wishing to sell particular bonds.
We assume the seller arrives with a reservation value v, which represents her outside opportunities. The reser-
vation value can be viewed, for example, as the continuation value associated with contacting a diﬀerent dealer and
searching for better terms of trade. The dealer’s decision about whether to trade depends on her expectations about
the price she will eventually obtain on selling the bond and the costs she anticipates in intermediating the trade.
We denote the eventual sales price as p, and its expectation as E(p | X), where X is a set of conditioning variables,
observable to the dealer and the seller. The anticipated cost of intermediating the trade is c(X,θ), where θ is a set
of parameters to be estimated. Finally, let p
∗ be the price the dealer oﬀers to the seller.
We assume that the dealer is risk-neutral with indirect utility function equal to E(p | X) − c(X,θ) − p
∗, the
expected proﬁt from purchasing the bond today for p
∗, then reselling it in the future for an expected price of E(p | X),
and incurring the expected intermediation cost, c(X,θ). The seller is also assumed to be risk-neutral with indirect
utility function equal to p
∗ −v, the price she receives for selling the bond today, p
∗, less her reservation value for the
bond, v.
The seller and dealer engage in an alternating oﬀer game with possibility of breakdown, the solution of which
can be described by the generalized Nash solution. Let ρ be the bargaining power of the dealer relative to that of the
seller, where ρ ∈ [0,1]. If ρ = 0, the seller has all the bargaining power, and if ρ = 1, the dealer has all the bargaining
power.
9The equilibrium transaction price p
∗ maximizes the generalized Nash product
max





subject to the participation constraints
E(p | X) − c(X,θ) − p
∗ ≥ 0, (2)
p
∗ − v ≥ 0. (3)
Condition (2) requires the price to be less than the dealer’s expected net revenues from reselling the bond, and
condition (3) requires the price to exceed the seller’s reservation value. The participation constraints can only be
satisﬁed if there are positive gains from trade:
E(p | X) − c(X,θ) − v ≥ 0. (4)
If the gains from trade are not positive, the game ends and no trade takes place.
The ﬁrst-order condition when the gains from trade are positive is
(1 − ρ)(E(p | X) − c(X,θ) − p
∗) + ρ(v − p
∗) = 0. (5)
Solving (5) for p
∗, the equilibrium oﬀer price is
p
∗ = ρv + (1 − ρ)(E(p | X) − c(X,θ)). (6)
The transaction price is a weighted-average of the seller’s reservation value and the dealer’s expected net revenues
from reselling the bond. The weights are given by the relative bargaining power of the counterparties.
If the seller has all the bargaining power (ρ = 0), the oﬀer price is equal to the expected cash ﬂows that the
dealer receives from reselling the bond, E(p | X) − c(X,θ), and the dealer makes zero expected proﬁts. If the dealer
has all the bargaining power (ρ = 1), the oﬀer price is equal to the seller’s reservation price for the bond and the
dealer makes positive expected proﬁts.
Once the dealer has the bonds she will in turn sell them for p, which will diﬀer from the expected price by an
expectational error with mean zero:
e ≡ p − E(p | X). (7)
The realized markup will consist of this expectational error, along with that portion of the surplus the dealer is able
10to extract from the seller. To see this, note that
p − p
∗ = E(p | X) + e − p
∗
= E(p | X) + e − (ρv + (1 − ρ)[E(p | X) − c(X,θ)])
= c(X,θ) + e + ρ(E(p | X) − c(X,θ) − v). (8)
A transaction takes place, and p − p
∗ is observed, if and only if
ρ(E(p | X) − c(X,θ) − v) ≥ 0. (9)
Condition (9) follows because ρ ∈ [0,1] and because the participation constraints, (2) and (3) can both be satisﬁed
if and only if the gains to trade are positive: E(p | X) − c(X,θ) − v ≥ 0.
4.2 Estimating the Model
The model in equation (8) ﬁts naturally into a speciﬁcation that can be estimated using Stochastic Frontier Analysis.
Greene (2002) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) provide descriptions of Stochastic Frontier Analysis at a textbook
level. The classic applications of Stochastic Frontier Analysis in production, such as Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt
(1977), estimate production or cost functions that are viewed as the most eﬃcient outcomes possible. Individual
observations deviate from this ideal by a symmetric error that has zero mean, and by a one-sided error that is
interpreted as ineﬃciency speciﬁc to that ﬁrm. Stochastic Frontier Analysis has been applied in ﬁnancial economics
by Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996) and Koop and Li (2001) to study IPO underpricing, by Berger and Mester
(1997) and Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore (2001) to study eﬃciency in the banking industry, and by
Habib and Ljungqvist (2003) to study the role of incentives in mitigating agency costs.
In our application, the cost of intermediating the trade to the dealer, c(Xi,θ), can be viewed as the “eﬃcient”
markup from the standpoint of seller i, where we now use i to index the transactions in the data. Such a markup
would be attained on average by sellers who have suﬃcient bargaining power to drive dealers to their reservation
prices. Even in that case, equation (8) implies that observed markups would vary around this cost by an expectational
error, ei. If sellers lack bargaining power relative to dealers, the observed markup will also deviate from the dealer’s
cost by a one-sided error which reﬂects the dealer’s market or bargaining power and the seller’s reservation price.
Measures of the relative “size,” or variance, of the expectational and one-sided errors provide information about the
relative importance of the dealers’ market power.
It is natural to interpret the markup in the model in percentage terms. For trades taking place across days, we
also interpret the model as applying to excess returns over what would be earned on an index of municipal bonds.
Let Rindex,i be the return on a municipal bond index, and deﬁne the forecast error ηi
ηi = Rindex,i − E(Rindex,i | Xi). (10)
11To rewrite the model in percentage terms divide equation (8) by the initial bond price, p
∗
i, and subtract the
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−E(Rindex,i | Xi) are the dealer’ s costs in excess of the expected return on an index of municipal bonds.




− E(Rindex,i | Xi) as the cost of intermediation. Since p
∗
i is positive, the normalization in
equation (13) does not change the one-sided nature of the second error term.
To arrive at an econometric speciﬁcation, we put parametric structure on the distribution of the error, i, and
the distribution of the seller’s reservation value, vi. We assume i ∼ N(0,σ
2
i ). We allow the distribution to depend
on the characteristics of the bond or the seller through the variance. Reservation values are drawn from a distribution
centered on the dealer’s expected net proceeds from selling the bond. That is,
E(vi | Xi) = E(pi | Xi) − c(Xi,θ). (14)
It is natural to assume potential sellers’ reservation values are “rational” in this sense. They reﬂect correct expecta-
tions on average. Deﬁne νi as the deviation of vi around its mean normalized by the price:
νi ≡




Substituting equation (15) into equation (13),
ξi = ρiνi. (16)
We parameterize νi as a double exponential, where the density on each side of the mean is 0.5 times the exponential
density with parameter λi. Again, we allow the distribution from which the reservation price is drawn to depend
on the characteristics of the trade. The distribution conditional on νi ≥ 0 is exponential with parameter λi. The
one-sided error ξi, conditional on ξi ≥ 0, therefore is exponentially distributed with parameter
λi
ρi . The ﬁrst two
moments of ξi are










A natural speciﬁcation is to allow the distribution to depend on features such as the par value of the trade and
how the trade is handled by the dealer. We would expect large trades to originate with institutional investors, who are
12likely to be better informed about market conditions and who, because of the repeat business they bring to dealers,
can bargain more eﬀectively over any given transaction. We might also expect dealers to accept trades anticipating
the involvement of other dealers, or planning to split the bond between multiple buyers, only in situations where they
anticipate a large share of signiﬁcant gains to trade.
We estimate speciﬁcations where the exponential error term has parameter
ρi
λi that is a log-linear function of the








The variables Zi1,...,ZiK include the natural logarithm of trade size (par value), and dummies for whether the trade
is split, or moves through other dealers. We also allow the standard deviation of the symmetric error, σi, to depend






If a0 = 0, then
ρi
λi = 0. In this case, the sellers have all the bargaining power and there is no asymmetric error
in the realized markup. If a0 6= 0, then
ρi
λi 6= 0. In this case, the dealers have bargaining power and there is an
asymmetric error in the realized markup. Variables that are positively related to
ρi
λi in this speciﬁcation suggest
higher bargaining power for the dealers.
The heterogeneity across customers in the distribution of the asymmetric error can be viewed either as variation in
ρi or variation in the distribution of the customer reservation prices, λi. There is no natural econometric or economic
way to distinguish between variation in ρi or variation in λi across customers. We would expect more sophisticated
customers to come to the market with a better understanding of the dealers’ costs and resale opportunities. More
sophisticated customers would therefore demand prices leading to lower dealer proﬁts. This could be interpreted
either as a more concentrated distribution for their reservation prices, in which case we could allow λi to depend on
characteristics of the trade, or as greater bargaining power for the customer and thus heterogeneity in ρi.








where L is the number of regressors. Our methods also allow for the parties to condition their decisions on unobserved
heterogeneity in the cost function.
7
We report estimates of the stochastic frontier models for both narrowly and more broadly deﬁned samples. The
7The model can be generalized to allow the cost function to consist of two parts: c
∗(Xi,θ) + wi, where the
conditioning variables in Xi are observed by the econometrician, and wi is a mean-zero source of heterogeneity
observed by both the buyer and the seller, but not the econometrician. Then replacing c(Xi,θ) in equations (6)-(11)
with c
















− E(Rindex,i | Xi)
￿
+ i + ξi
where, now,
ξi ≡
ρi(E(pi | Xi) − c




13general conclusions of our analysis are very robust to the selection criteria we employ.
5 Empirical Results
Table 6 reports the results of ﬁtting the empirical model in equations (19)–(21) to Immediate Matches, conditioning
on the variables deﬁned in Table 3. The sample consists of transactions in seasoned bonds where the purchase from a
customer was sold oﬀ to customers on the same day with no intermediate purchases. There are 738,857 observations
used in the estimation. We use daily returns on the Lehman Brothers Municipal Bond Index as the index return,
Rindex. Since we use daily returns, Rindex = 0 if both sides of the transaction are completed on the same day.
In order to aid the interpretation of the coeﬃcients, we transformed the independent variables by subtracting
their sample means. The intercept term in the cost of intermediation function therefore measures the expected cost
of a typical trade. The intercept term in the volatility of the symmetric error measures the volatility of the symmetric
error for a typical trade, and the intercept term in the exponential error term measures the expected proﬁt from
market power.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 6 report the results of ﬁtting the model with all the parameters in the one-sided
error constrained to zero. With the one-sided error constrained to zero, the model corresponds to the case where the
sellers have all the bargaining power, and is a standard, cross-sectional regression analysis of the determinants of the
costs of trading. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The ﬁrst panel in Table 6 reports the coeﬃcients on




− E(Rindex,i | Xi). The second panel of the table reports the coeﬃcients
in the residual standard deviation.
Almost all the explanatory variables have signiﬁcant t-statistics. The signs are generally consistent with higher
markups where one would expect to see them if dealers do demand compensation for bearing liquidity costs and
interest rate risk. In environments with high interest rates, and more volatile rates, markups are larger. Bonds with
higher liquidity, measured by purchase frequency, earn dealers lower spreads. Pre-refunded bonds, which are riskless
because they are backed by trusts funded with treasury bonds, earn much lower spreads.
The second two columns of Table 6 report maximum-likelihood estimates of a stochastic frontier model with
speciﬁcation (19)-(21), with the parameters unrestricted. The ﬁrst panel of Table 6 reports the coeﬃcients in the




− E(Rindex,i | Xi). The second and third panels report the
estimates for the two error distributions. The ﬁnal panel reports the likelihood ratio.
Since the explanatory variables are demeaned in the model, the intercept terms are estimates of the expected
eﬃcient cost and the expected loss to dealer market power on an average transaction. The constant in the estimates
for the asymmetric error (98.30) is much larger than the constant in the cost function (23.29). The constant in the
cost function has a natural interpretation of the average eﬃcient cost of search or intermediation. Thus, much of the




+ i as the symmetric portion of the error in the model, and assuming that
E(vi | Xi) = E(pi | Xi) − c
∗(Xi,θ) − wi,
we can interpret ξi as the asymmetric portion of the error, and parameterize each as in the body of the paper.
14spread on the average transaction is attributed by the model to the dealer’s advantage in bargaining power. Similarly,
the intercept in the cost function and the constant in the volatility of the symmetric error both fall by over two-thirds
when the model allows for the one-sided error. Thus, more than two-thirds of the expected costs of trading and the
conditional volatility of that cost are ascribed to the dealers’ market power.
Several of the coeﬃcients in the speciﬁcation with a one-sided error decrease in absolute value relative to the
model with only a symmetric error distribution, both in economic and statistical signiﬁcance. For example, the
coeﬃcients on the size of the transaction are over ﬁve times larger in absolute value without the one-sided error, and
even switch sign for transactions larger than $500,000. The portion of the markup due to bargaining power, however,
is signiﬁcantly negatively related to size.
Table 7 conﬁrms that the qualitative results are robust to the sample selection, and adds variables that describe
how the trade was processed.
8 The table reports estimates using the Round-Trip Transactions, which include all
matched transaction pairs in seasoned bonds. There are 2,684,845 observations used in the estimation. The ﬁrst two
columns report estimates and t-statistics for the restricted model and the last two columns results for the unrestricted
model. The estimates for the restricted model reported in the ﬁrst two columns are similar to those reported in the
ﬁrst two columns of Table 6, although they do not tend to fall as much in absolute value or switch sign when we allow
for the asymmetric error. Again, allowing for a one-sided error dramatically decreases the size of the intercept terms
in the cost of intermediation function, and the volatility attributed to the one-sided error is much larger than that of
the symmetric error. The reduction in the absolute value of the coeﬃcients is particularly evident for liquidity related
variables. For example, the coeﬃcients on Transaction Frequency and Issue Size are one-third as large in absolute
value. That the eﬀects of these variables are subsumed by the asymmetric error term suggests that their explanatory
power for the markups may be due to the ability of dealers to extract greater rents in illiquid bonds rather than their
eﬀect on the dealer’s costs.
The models in Table 7 include dummy variables for the intermediation services interacted with the transaction
size in both the cost function and the speciﬁcations of the error terms. To interpret the coeﬃcients in the asymmetric
error term’s speciﬁcation, note that they enter the expected markup in exponential form. For example, for a large
trade with par value over $500,000, knowing the trade was split increases the expected gain to the dealer by a factor
of exp(0.41) = 1.51, or 51 per cent. The estimated coeﬃcients in the cost function suggest transactions that involve
other intermediaries or involve selling the bonds to multiple buyers earn higher markups for the dealers collectively.
This is what one would expect, since the dealers are clearly providing more service in these situations.
Interacting the size dummy variables with the other variables is both empirically and economically important,
since trade size proxies for heterogeneity in customer type. For instance, one would expect that pre-negotiation is
8We have also experimented with using a half-normal distribution for the one-sided error. Our empirical ﬁndings
are robust to such a change. For example, using this alternative speciﬁcation, the intercept terms for the cost function
and the asymmetric error are -1.51 (-97.45) and 158.12 (6134.12), respectively, for the immediate matches (t-statistics
in parentheses). The same parameter estimates for the FIFO sample are 12.28 (67.56) and 188.20 (4088.93). Like
the estimates in Tables 6 and 8 for the corresponding samples, in each case the intercept term in the cost function
is much lower than that in the asymmetric error speciﬁcation. The likelihood ratios associated with allowing for the
asymmetric error are also very large regardless of the speciﬁcation used.
15more pervasive for larger trades. Cases of large purchases remaining in dealer inventory over night suggest that the
seller urgently demanded liquidity. Such an interpretation is conﬁrmed in Table 7, by the positive coeﬃcients on
Overnight and Inventory Duration for par greater than $500,000 in the speciﬁcation of the asymmetric error, while
they appear with negative signs in the cost function.
Variables for how the trade is handled, such as whether it is split and whether other dealers are involved, appear
signiﬁcant in both the eﬃcient cost function and in the speciﬁcation of the asymmetric error. The positive coeﬃcients
suggest they increase the cost of processing these trades to the dealers. We would expect this as more intermediation
is clearly involved in such trades. These variables also appear as signiﬁcant in conditioning the distribution of the
one-sided error term. Trades that involve more extensive intermediation earn higher markups than the apparent
increase in the dealer’s cost. Dealers appear to undertake these transactions only in situations where they expect to
earn high returns.
A partial explanation for the result that involving other dealers increases the dealers’ bargaining power may
involve the types of dealers who tend to sell bonds to other dealers. Blocks of bonds purchased from institutions
are likely to be split into smaller blocks in order to sell them to retail investors. Some large dealers have no retail
distribution capacity. They will step forward to provide liquidity to an institution wishing to sell a large position
knowing they will probably need to sell the bonds to another dealer, and appear to do so only when the terms are
particularly advantageous.
The intercept term in the eﬃcient cost function is higher than in Table 6, presumably since the narrow sample
biases against trades that involve extensive intermediation.
Table 8 reports the results of estimating the same model as in Table 7 but using our broadest sample, the FIFO
sample. The FIFO sample has 4,583,419 purchases from customers. The results are generally similar to the results
from the Immediate Matches and the Round-Trip Transactions, except that now the intercept term in the eﬃcient
cost function lies between the estimates obtained from the narrow and the broad sample. This diﬀerence across
samples is presumably due to the inclusion of the FIFO matched trades. The FIFO matched trades add more liquid
bonds to the sample, and may also pick up trades where the dealers ended up stuck with bonds that were diﬃcult to
unload, and thus not immediately matched, leading to lower measured markups compared to Table 7.
Finally, Table 9 provides evidence that our central results are not due to any particular feature of interest rate
movements during the sample period. The table reports results for the stochastic frontier model, separately estimated
for days when bond prices were rising, falling, or mixed. Mixed days are ones when yields for diﬀerent maturities
moved in diﬀerent directions. Rising and falling markets were days when all rates fell or rose, respectively. The
intercepts in the cost function are similar to our previous estimates, and the intercept in the asymmetric error term
is large, conﬁrming that the model attributes much of the cost of trading to dealer market power across diﬀerent
market conditions. Our results are robust to the overall trend in interest rates.
166 Transparency
The MSRB has enacted changes in reporting requirements over the sample period, increasing transparency in the
municipal bond market. Increases in the public availability and immediacy of price information occurred in October
2000, May 2002, November 2002, and June 2003.
9 In October 2000 the MSRB began oﬀering the “Comprehensive
Report,” which lists all municipal securities transactions with a one-month delay, regardless of the frequency of
trading. The one-month delay in comprehensive price data has been shortened in several steps, with comprehensive
data currently being disseminated one week after the trade date.
The second report, the “T+1 Daily Report,” is published daily by the MSRB and reports individual transaction
data from the previous day for each issue that meets a trade threshold. The trade threshold set in January 2000 was
four trades including both inter-dealer and customer trades. In May 2002, the trade threshold was lowered to three
trades, in November 2002 the trade threshold was lowered to two trades, and in June 2003 the threshold was lowered
to one trade. As of June 2003, therefore, all trades are reported in the T+1 Daily Report. By April 2003, there were
twenty-four subscribers to the T+1 Daily Report and ﬁfty-one to the Comprehensive Report.
To capture the eﬀects of increased transparency, we add dummy variables for the diﬀerent regimes associated
with the number of days until the release of the comprehensive report. The T+1 Daily Report, on the other
hand, introduces variation through time for a given bond. To exploit the variation from the T+1 Daily Report, we
introduce a dummy variable for whether the bond has appeared in the Daily Report within the last week of the trade
in question. To evaluate if the increased transparency has aﬀected markups in aggregate, we include ﬁxed eﬀects in
the cost function, the symmetric error term, and the asymmetric error term.
Table 10 summarizes the estimation results. The negative coeﬃcients on the time dummies in the symmetric
error term indicate that price uncertainty has decreased as transparency has increased. The impact on cost and
market power is very diﬀerent for retail-sized compared to institutional-sized transactions. Increases in transparency
have decreased the dealers’ market power in transactions less that $100,000 and have increased the dealers bargaining
power signiﬁcantly in transactions more than $100,000. It seems clear, then, that the increased transparency has
reduced cross-subsidization from smaller traders in favor of larger traders. The model ascribes some of the reduction
to reduced costs, perhaps because the greater transparency is encouraging more activity by smaller traders and thus
increasing liquidity. The model also ascribes some of the reduction to less bargaining power for dealers in their trading
with small traders, perhaps because timely reporting of price information disciplines the dealers.
We also ask how the availability of price information on the most recent transactions in the Daily Report has
aﬀected dealer proﬁts. For this purpose, we limit attention to bond issues with suﬃcient transactions to identify
time-series variation in markups due to inclusion in the Daily Report. We eliminate issues with no variation in the
Daily Report and focus on the time period May 2000 - June 2003. In addition, we exclude all issuers with less than 50
transactions in any of the three transactions size ranges $0-$100,000, $100,000-$500,000, and greater than $500,000.
The estimation includes issuer ﬁxed eﬀects.
9See www.msrb.com.
17Table 11 summarizes the results. Surprisingly, the dealer’s bargaining power seems unaﬀected by the availability
of price information in the Daily Report. Only for medium transaction sizes, is the negative coeﬃcient on “Daily
Report” marginally signiﬁcant.
10 We interpret the ﬁnding as evidence that the dealers’ bargaining power does not
solely arise from a lack of information about the prices of individual bonds but rather from a lack of timely information
about market conditions generally.
7 Conclusion
Corporate and municipal bonds have traditionally been traded primarily in opaque, decentralized markets in which
price information is costly to gather. This may oﬀer opportunities for intermediaries, in their role of facilitating the
matching of buyers and sellers and providing liquidity, to extract monopoly rents or cross-subsidize across diﬀerent
groups of customers. The extent to which they operate competitively is an empirical issue. Data on trade in these
markets, however, has been diﬃcult to obtain in the past, and even when such data is available separately identifying
costs and rents to the intermediary is problematic.
We analyze a comprehensive database of all trades between broker-dealers in municipal bonds and their customers.
The data is only released to the public with a substantial lag, and thus the market remained relatively opaque to
the traders themselves even though the data is available to researchers. Because the bonds trade infrequently, this
transaction data is low frequency for each bond, but because there are so many bonds we have millions of observations.
We show that the pattern of dealer proﬁts in round-trip transactions implies dealers earn lower average proﬁts
on larger trades, even while the dealers bear more risk on larger trades. We formulate a simple structural model that
allows us to estimate measures of dealer bargaining power and relate it to characteristics of the trades. The model
can be estimated as a Stochastic Frontier Analysis model. The results suggest dealers exercise substantial market
power in their trades with customers. Our measures of market power decrease in trade size and appear larger for
trades that are more complex to intermediate. Increases in transparency lead to reductions in the dealers’ bargaining
power in retail sized transactions and increases the dealers’ bargaining power in institutional sized transactions.
10The results are robust to diﬀerent sample section criteria, state ﬁxed eﬀects, and the inclusion of variables for
the number of transactions on each day during the previous week.
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19A Appendix
A.1 Data Filter
A number of transactions in the MSRB database are missing information about the bond issue. In case of missing
bond features such as coupon rate, issue date or maturity date, we perform searches over the entire database to
recover the missing data. We use the bond description text ﬁeld to identify the state in which the bond was issued,
and the type and purpose of the bond. We identify the issuer from the CUSIP number. If the time stamp of the
transaction is missing (or zero) we assume the transaction takes place at 6 am.
Next we eliminate obvious data errors such as negative prices, and maturity or issuance dates that do not make
sense. We drop observations where the transaction size is missing, or where the reported par amount is less than
$1,000. The remaining observations on the independent variables used in the estimation are winsorized at the 0.5%
and 99.5% levels if they are symmetric, or at the 99.5% level if their values are one-sided.
MSRB reporting rules do not explicitly require broker-dealers to report both the transaction price and yield. In
many instances no yield is reported, and in fewer cases the transaction price is missing. We drop observations were
the transaction price is missing, and truncate the distribution of net markups at 0.5% and 99.5%.
11
A.2 Sample Selection
The MSRB transactions database does not identify the broker-dealer who is intermediating a given transaction, nor
the identity of the retail/institutional buyer/seller. The database, however, allows identifying the type of transaction
(purchase from customer, sale to customer, inter-dealer transaction), and the time of the transaction up to the minute.
We use a matching algorithm to select purchase and sales tickets that are likely to be associated with the same
dealer. The basic principle is to match a given dealer purchase with consecutive sales to customers up until the next
purchase from a customer or the end of the sample period. If the par amount of a sales ticket in this sequence is
larger than the initial purchase amount, this particular sales transaction is ignored. All remaining sales transactions
are aggregated. If the cumulative par amount of these sales transactions up until the next purchase equals the par
amount of the preceding purchase, we have identiﬁed a matched pair. If there is a one-to-one match between a
11Alternatively, we have used a log-linear regression approach with similar results to recover the price-yield rela-
tionship using all observations in the database on the given issue. In this case we use the reported yields to predict
the transaction price, or the other way around depending on which information is missing. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst
run three sets of ordinary-least-squares regressions of log-price on yield to obtain coeﬃcient estimates. For robustness
we eliminate outliers by only including price and yield observations within two standard deviations from their corre-
sponding sample median. MSRB reporting rules for yields diﬀer between transactions eﬀected above or below par (see
MSRB Rule G-12 (c) (v) (I) for details). We therefore perform two regressions in which we only include transaction
prices above or, respectively, below par, and a third using all observations. Depending on whether the reported yield
exceeds the coupon rate, coeﬃcient estimates from the ﬁrst or the second regression are used. Coeﬃcient estimates
from the third regression are used whenever in either of the former regressions the R-squared is below 33%, or the
number of observations in the sub-samples are less than six and less than one third of all observations. Given the
small number of observations for many bond issues, we found these criteria eﬀective at producing sensible values.
Finally, if the R-squared in the overall regression is less than 33%, or the total number of observations is insuﬃcient
to apply OLS in the ﬁrst place, we recover the transaction price from the reported yield assuming that the yield is
reported as yield-to-maturity.
20purchase and a single sale, we call these pairs no-splits. Otherwise the purchase is being split into several smaller
units. We record the time of the purchase and the par weighted-average transaction time of the sales. In addition we
determine whether transactions occurred between dealers in the same issue at any time between the purchase and
sale date, and mark the matched pair as involving inter-dealer intermediation.
We match the remaining purchase and sales transactions by applying a ﬁrst-in-ﬁrst-out (FIFO) rule. After elim-
inating all transactions associated with matched pairs, we start with the ﬁrst purchase in the remaining transaction
sequence for each bond issue. We assign to it all consecutive sales transactions until they aggregate to or exceed the
purchase amount—independently of whether other purchases occur in the meantime. If the par amount of these sales
tickets exceeds that of the purchase, we allocate the residual to the next purchase if it occurred before the last of the
consecutive sales. Otherwise we discard the residual. We record a partial match, if the par amount of the purchase
exceeds that of all sales until the end of the sample. The matching process continues with the next purchase until it
is ﬁlled.
Using these matching rules we construct three separate samples. Table 2 describes the diﬀerent sampling criteria.
We calculate net markups as the diﬀerence between the realized gross markup in per cent and the index return on
a maturity-matched portfolio of municipal bonds. The gross markup is the relative diﬀerence between the dealer’s
purchase price and the par weighted-average sale price:
Net Markup = Gross Markup - Return on Index, (22)
Gross Markup =
Par-Weighted Average Sale Price - Purchase Price
Purchase Price
. (23)
21Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All Sales to Purchases from Transactions
Transactions Customers Customers between Dealers
All Issues
Observations 26,803,575 15,678,293 5,689,375 5,435,907
Issues 1,079,689 1,060,692 712,551 635,859
Issuers 46,497 46,132 43,086 37,045
Ave. Par 423,512 372,030 694,030 288,866
Total Value 11,255,791 5,786,067 3,919,355 1,550,370
Coupon rate 4.1% 4.1% 4.0% 4.5%
Age 3.8 3.0 5.6 3.9
Maturity 18.7 18.8 19.4 17.4
New Issues
Observations 7,926,083 5,835,686 375,683 1,714,714
Issues 605,137 596,650 143,369 328,282
Issuers 26,093 25,882 17,181 18,613
Ave. Par 471,317 399,476 1,638,496 460,090
Total Value 3,697,634 2,301,170 611,535 784,930
Coupon rate 4.1% 4.1% 3.6% 4.1%
Age 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03
Maturity 15.1 15.7 14.0 13.7
Seasoned Issues
Observations 18,877,492 9,842,607 5,313,692 3,721,193
Issues 649,672 633,587 630,159 389,194
Issuers 41,710 41,268 41,292 34,348
Ave. Par 403,440 355,757 627,255 209,966
Total Value 7,558,157 3,484,897 3,307,821 765,440
Coupon rate 4.4% 4.4% 4.1% 4.9%
Age 5.3 4.8 6.0 5.7
Maturity 20.2 20.7 19.8 19.2
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the MSRB transactions data from May 1, 2000 to January
10, 2004. The Total Value is the market value of the trades measured in millions.
22Table 2: Sample Selection
Sample Description
Immediate Matches All matched transaction pairs in seasoned bonds where
the bond purchased by a dealer is not split into smaller
lots; there are no inter-dealer transactions between
the purchase and the sale date; and the sale and purchase
occur on the same day.
Round-Trip Transactions All matched transaction pairs in seasoned bonds.
FIFO Sample All Round-Trip Transactions augmented by all purchase
transactions in seasoned bonds that can be matched






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 4: Sample Selection
(a) Descriptive Statistics (Medians, Common Sample after Filtering)
Immediate Round-Trip FIFO All
Matches Transactions Sample
Observations 738,857 2,684,845 4,583,419 5,300,265
Gross Markup (bp) 133.9 189.0 169.0 NA
Net Markup (bp) 133.9 185.4 161.8 NA
Yield (purchase) 4.846 4.781 4.867 4.850
Yield (sale) 4.106 4.100 4.228 4.250
Par (million) 0.025 0.025 0.035 0.035
Inventory Duration (day) 0.031 0.893 3.107 NA
Maturity (year) 11.28 10.23 13.07 12.85
Coupon (percent) 5.100 5.000 5.000 5.000
Age (year) 6.478 5.500 5.095 5.142
Transaction Frequency (1/day) 0.029 0.019 0.039 0.039
Issue Size (log million) -0.693 -0.955 0.000 0.000
State Volume (billion) 0.222 0.231 0.236 0.237
State Order Imbalance (billion) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
State New Issues (billion) 0.060 0.064 0.064 0.065
Treasury Yield (percent) 4.728 4.695 4.860 4.805
Treasury Range (percent) 1.602 1.610 1.597 1.626
(b) Distribution of the Time in Dealer Inventory
(Kaplan-Meier Estimate)
Day Round-Trip FIFO All
Transactions Sample
1 56.5% 37.6% 33.4%
2 70.8% 48.5% 43.0%
3 78.2% 54.8% 48.6%
4 83.0% 59.3% 52.6%
5 86.4% 62.8% 55.8%
10 94.1% 72.6% 64.5%
30 99.2% 84.4% 75.2%
90 99.9% 92.1% 82.4%
360 100.0% 98.0% 88.9%
25Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Matched Trades
(a) Frequency
FIFO Sample Par ∈ (0,.1) Par ∈ [.1,.5) Par ∈ [.5,∞)
Observations 4,583,419 3,100,204 794,227 688,988
No Split × No Interdealer 55.3% 61.4% 40.9% 44.3%
Split × No Interdealer 18.3% 14.0% 22.7% 32.8%
No Split × Interdealer 13.0% 15.6% 11.0% 3.5%
Split × Interdealer 13.4% 9.0% 25.4% 19.4%
(b) Net Markups–measured in basis points
FIFO Sample Par ∈ (0,.1) Par ∈ [.1,.5) Par ∈ [.5,∞)
FIFO Sample Median 162 213 81 0
Mean 177 230 110 16
S.D. 199 188 180 151
No Split × No Interdealer Median 151 201 22 0
Mean 165 213 41 -9
S.D. 179 165 142 111
Split × No Interdealer Median 151 231 141 0
Mean 152 236 151 -10
S.D. 186 155 160 147
No Split × Interdealer Median 208 246 85 28
Mean 242 276 114 44
S.D. 248 249 187 168
Split × Interdealer Median 177 241 156 91
Mean 202 259 183 113
S.D. 224 236 206 187
(c) Frequency of Net Loss
FIFO Sample Par ∈ (0,.1) Par ∈ [.1,.5) Par ∈ [.5,∞)
FIFO Sample 13.6% 5.7% 19.4% 42.2%
No Split × No Interdealer 12.8% 4.8% 29.2% 45.8%
Split × No Interdealer 18.4% 3.9% 11.5% 51.8%
No Split × Interdealer 10.7% 8.7% 16.4% 29.9%
Split × Interdealer 12.7% 9.7% 11.9% 20.2%
26Table 6: Parameter Estimates of the Stochastic Frontier Model: Immediate Matches
No Market Power Market Power
Cost Function Parameters
Constant 151.66 (1273.39) 23.29 (96.48)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ (0, .1) −42.70 (-604.42) −7.77 (-96.46)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −30.38 (-165.16) −0.22 (-12.28)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −5.01 (-52.34) 0.73 (66.16)
Maturity 0.94 (70.18) 0.01 (8.83)
Coupon −5.22 (-37.74) 0.01 (0.82)
Coupon Zero or Missing −53.22 (-66.71) −1.32 (-18.56)
Age −0.24 (-12.37) 0.00 (-0.52)
Transaction Frequency −5.72 (-21.59) 0.12 (5.58)
Issue Size 2.03 (31.00) −0.10 (-13.47)
State Volume 2.10 (12.65) −0.01 (-1.05)
State Order Imbalance 1.68 (2.22) 0.27 (4.32)
State New Issues 5.06 (12.67) 0.02 (0.53)
Treasury Yield 7.70 (90.47) 0.05 (6.14)
Treasury Range 2.03 (29.48) 0.04 (6.91)
Revenue Bond −0.72 (-4.04) 0.02 (1.06)
Tax Revenue Bond 3.65 (9.14) −0.09 (-2.53)
General Obligation Bond −2.13 (-4.67) −0.09 (-2.09)
Guaranteed 10.64 (6.75) 0.08 (0.49)
Prerefunded −34.23 (-51.14) −0.31 (-2.73)
Certiﬁcates of Partn 1.43 (3.77) 0.04 (1.33)
County Issuer 1.10 (6.24) 0.06 (4.25)
School District Issuer 7.77 (22.22) 0.24 (6.88)
Development Authority −0.36 (-1.19) 0.07 (2.81)
Financial Authority −1.91 (-5.72) 0.06 (2.19)
Housing Authority −3.76 (-4.00) −0.60 (-5.24)
Sewer Authority 2.18 (5.00) 0.11 (2.75)
Utilities 7.96 (15.71) 0.09 (1.80)
Redevelopment 8.94 (10.93) −0.30 (-2.99)
Improvement 0.22 (0.69) 0.08 (2.97)
Facilities 0.27 (1.31) 0.00 (-0.22)
Reﬁnancing 1.72 (10.30) 0.02 (1.38)
Symmetric Error Distribution
Constant 91.55 (5490.75) 15.24 (408.58)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ (0, .1) −0.20 (-263.20) −0.75 (-266.14)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −0.28 (-146.22) 0.73 (53.91)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −0.50 (-183.84) −0.59 (-84.35)
Asymmetric Error Distribution
Constant - - 98.30 (2354.31)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ (0, .1) - - −0.45 (-368.77)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.1, .5) - - −0.55 (-203.30)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) - - −0.92 (-277.44)
Likelihood Ratio 263, 508
Observations 738,857
Table notes on the next page.
27Notes for Table 6






− Rindex,i = θo +
L X
l=1
θlXil + i + ξi,
with pi the price that the dealer sells the bond for, p
∗
i the price that the dealer pays the seller for the bond, Xil for




and ξi is exponential distributed with parameters a0
QK
k=1 e
akZk, with Zik for k = 1,...,K conditioning variables.
The ﬁrst two columns report the parameter estimates and t-statistics in parentheses for the model with a0 = a1 =
... = aK = 0 and the second two columns report the parameter estimates and t-statistics in parentheses for the
unrestricted model.
28Table 7: Parameter Estimates of the Stochastic Frontier Model: Round-Trip Transactions
No Market Power Market Power
Cost Function Parameters
Constant 197.07 (2749.20) 100.41 (788.83)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ (0, .1) −47.40 (−734.26) −33.18 (−405.30)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −39.76 (−229.57) −9.47 (−60.45)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −20.91 (−146.27) 0.05 (0.43)
Overnight × Par ∈ (0, .1) 40.92 (224.88) 20.91 (69.77)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 35.58 (91.24) 19.75 (49.34)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 7.28 (19.54) −5.19 (−17.48)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ (0, .1) −0.99 (−59.42) −2.13 (−114.11)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −1.04 (−33.29) −1.46 (−53.24)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.54 (13.86) −0.66 (−21.36)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 40.55 (177.16) 53.86 (134.57)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 72.59 (175.86) 58.33 (82.16)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 30.08 (69.40) 2.53 (8.97)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 68.44 (200.59) 14.37 (29.93)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 47.01 (81.91) 25.77 (52.09)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 65.12 (78.26) 29.09 (39.37)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 77.53 (133.95) 30.76 (37.13)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 90.53 (157.50) 45.55 (75.11)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 106.05 (157.87) 43.38 (66.46)
Maturity 4.41 (355.73) 2.26 (192.68)
Coupon −1.89 (−18.47) −4.12 (−49.69)
Coupon Zero or Missing −3.04 (−5.19) −45.12 (−93.46)
Age −0.43 (−23.73) −0.28 (−19.92)
Transaction Frequency −33.32 (−79.91) −11.81 (−45.30)
Issue Size −1.18 (−25.04) −0.43 (−10.93)
State Volume 7.95 (47.12) 4.47 (35.86)
State Order Imbalance 1.06 (1.38) 1.36 (2.40)
State New Issues 9.31 (23.75) 6.51 (22.49)
Treasury Yield 9.01 (132.56) 7.40 (139.70)
Treasury Range 4.05 (64.56) 3.18 (67.76)
Revenue Bond −0.98 (−6.22) −2.28 (−18.41)
Tax Revenue Bond 7.67 (22.87) 4.97 (18.98)
General Obligation Bond −5.42 (−11.74) −5.43 (−16.01)
Guaranteed 8.16 (7.38) 8.64 (9.36)
Prerefunded −47.28 (−97.61) −36.57 (−86.66)
Certiﬁcates of Partn 3.07 (9.10) 2.61 (10.08)
County Issuer 1.05 (6.45) 0.80 (6.46)
School District Issuer 7.38 (31.58) 5.15 (27.32)
Development Authority −4.27 (−12.87) −2.05 (−8.85)
Financial Authority −3.06 (−8.13) −0.31 (−1.19)
Housing Authority 0.16 (0.19) −3.73 (−5.78)
Sewer Authority 1.63 (4.69) 2.23 (8.02)
Utilities 6.85 (16.85) 5.95 (17.90)
Redevelopment 6.16 (10.15) 5.24 (10.90)
Improvement −1.23 (−4.40) −0.20 (−0.92)
Facilities 0.59 (2.79) 1.05 (6.80)
Reﬁnancing 2.96 (19.67) 2.14 (18.49)
The table is continued on the next page.
29Table 7: Parameter Estimates of the Stochastic Frontier Model: Round-Trip Transactions (cont’d)
No Market Power Market Power
Symmetric Error Distribution
Constant 112.95 (5000.00) 66.20 (3342.84)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ (0, .1) −0.11 (−119.90) −0.25 (−125.79)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −0.14 (−52.40) 0.03 (4.16)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −0.17 (−56.12) −0.15 (−22.68)
Overnight × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.05 (21.63) −0.04 (−8.35)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.14 (26.65) 0.33 (19.12)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.19 (26.15) 0.28 (20.65)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.01 (46.52) 0.00 (16.71)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.01 (18.14) 0.01 (10.02)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.01 (17.96) 0.01 (11.37)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) −0.01 (−2.31) 0.24 (35.95)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.07 (12.22) 0.55 (27.10)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.16 (19.90) −0.18 (−9.48)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.28 (84.86) 0.08 (8.53)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.07 (8.95) 0.00 (−0.21)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.00 (−0.04) −0.02 (−0.65)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.27 (46.67) 0.16 (9.02)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.17 (25.49) 0.13 (5.40)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.16 (15.89) 0.08 (3.23)
Asymmetric Error Distribution
Constant - - 90.94 (3307.92)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ (0, .1) - - −0.16 (−143.93)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.1, .5) - - −0.34 (−127.84)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) - - −0.39 (−101.79)
Overnight × Par ∈ (0, .1) - - 0.23 (64.43)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.1, .5) - - 0.18 (32.47)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) - - 0.38 (50.99)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ (0, .1) - - 0.01 (55.63)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.1, .5) - - 0.00 (21.80)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) - - 0.01 (33.79)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) - - −0.08 (−15.69)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) - - 0.18 (23.94)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) - - 0.41 (51.36)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) - - 0.44 (107.73)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) - - 0.16 (22.84)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) - - 0.18 (11.73)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) - - 0.47 (66.59)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) - - 0.41 (60.17)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) - - 0.53 (51.44)
Likelihood Ratio 291, 778
Observations 2, 684, 845
Table notes on the next page.
30Notes for Table 7






− Rindex,i = θo +
L X
l=1
θlXil + i + ξi,
with pi the price that the dealer sells the bond for, p
∗
i the price that the dealer pays the seller for the bond, Xil for




and ξi is exponential distributed with parameters a0
QK
k=1 e
akZk, with Zik for k = 1,...,K conditioning variables.
The ﬁrst two columns report the parameter estimates and t-statistics in parentheses for the model with a0 = a1 =
... = aK = 0 and the second two columns report the parameter estimates and t-statistics in parentheses for the
unrestricted model.
31Table 8: Parameter Estimates of the Stochastic Frontier Model: FIFO Sample
No Market Power Market Power
Cost Function Parameters
Constant 173.37 (2158.04) 53.70 (423.19)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ (0, .1) −44.83 (−737.68) −27.07 (−366.54)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −33.23 (−219.15) −5.14 (−39.62)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −10.16 (−86.55) 1.33 (12.37)
Overnight × Par ∈ (0, .1) 33.15 (184.56) 15.90 (55.41)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −2.82 (−8.56) 11.43 (30.49)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −4.53 (−16.16) −26.16 (−90.00)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ (0, .1) −0.46 (−152.13) −1.00 (−245.93)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −0.68 (−132.93) −1.25 (−183.76)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −0.62 (−115.24) −1.38 (−185.95)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 45.39 (196.13) 52.08 (139.37)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 88.97 (233.92) 33.81 (74.45)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 15.68 (52.24) 1.05 (3.70)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 71.88 (217.05) 15.79 (35.57)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 68.30 (120.88) 15.13 (29.25)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 57.46 (70.28) 17.55 (23.74)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 84.49 (199.57) 40.18 (65.77)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 137.99 (294.24) 49.15 (91.07)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 122.13 (260.01) 53.28 (101.06)
Maturity 3.84 (361.44) 2.51 (272.24)
Coupon −4.01 (−40.32) −8.63 (−103.79)
Coupon Zero or Missing −39.15 (−68.80) −81.55 (−168.97)
Age 0.23 (13.53) 0.23 (16.57)
Transaction Frequency −21.57 (−78.10) −12.83 (−58.41)
Issue Size −3.84 (−84.31) −3.62 (−93.00)
State Volume 1.92 (12.32) 0.92 (7.40)
State Order Imbalance 3.62 (5.12) 3.03 (5.34)
State New Issues 17.02 (46.44) 13.56 (46.31)
Treasury Yield 7.23 (106.74) 6.22 (114.82)
Treasury Range 3.74 (62.08) 2.85 (59.74)
Revenue Bond −1.76 (−11.47) −2.56 (−20.36)
Tax Revenue Bond 6.87 (21.30) 4.57 (17.32)
General Obligation Bond −1.05 (−2.53) −4.15 (−12.38)
Guaranteed 11.24 (10.18) 10.40 (11.22)
Prerefunded −51.68 (−110.57) −39.98 (−98.38)
Certiﬁcates of Partn 3.03 (9.13) 3.73 (13.80)
County Issuer 3.33 (21.32) 2.21 (17.51)
School District Issuer 10.26 (42.27) 6.30 (31.64)
Development Authority −3.55 (−11.96) −3.35 (−14.16)
Financial Authority −1.96 (−5.83) 0.00 (0.01)
Housing Authority −10.44 (−12.38) −11.15 (−15.85)
Sewer Authority 3.21 (9.62) 3.74 (13.58)
Utilities 8.51 (21.13) 6.21 (18.34)
Redevelopment 8.57 (14.31) 7.03 (14.12)
Improvement −3.50 (−12.92) −2.18 (−9.92)
Facilities 1.62 (8.42) 2.08 (13.39)
Reﬁnancing 2.04 (14.20) 1.79 (15.22)
The table is continued on the next page.
32Table 8: Parameter Estimates of the Stochastic Frontier Model: FIFO Sample (cont’d)
No Market Power Market Power
Symmetric Error Distribution
Constant 149.53 (7000.00) 98.66 (6552.03)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ (0, .1) −0.14 (−184.13) −0.21 (−154.40)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −0.14 (−69.72) 0.03 (7.94)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −0.10 (−56.99) −0.08 (−29.27)
Overnight × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.25 (128.52) 0.27 (62.57)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.44 (113.23) 1.10 (111.78)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.59 (134.43) 0.92 (124.56)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.00 (148.59) 0.00 (118.77)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.00 (98.52) 0.00 (92.81)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.00 (108.29) 0.00 (103.15)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.04 (16.04) 0.19 (39.84)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.10 (23.68) 0.00 (0.47)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.14 (33.11) 0.09 (14.08)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.32 (134.34) 0.22 (43.54)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.14 (26.05) −0.10 (−10.38)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.12 (12.36) −0.07 (−4.33)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.34 (112.94) 0.36 (57.10)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.21 (49.31) −0.11 (−11.86)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.15 (31.20) −0.05 (−4.73)
Asymmetric Error Distribution
Constant - - 107.88 (4588.58)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ (0, .1) - - −0.22 (−239.72)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.1, .5) - - −0.34 (−157.50)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) - - −0.19 (−89.83)
Overnight × Par ∈ (0, .1) - - 0.23 (73.18)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.1, .5) - - 0.07 (13.61)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) - - 0.67 (130.98)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ (0, .1) - - 0.00 (165.23)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.1, .5) - - 0.00 (126.49)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) - - 0.00 (161.77)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) - - 0.00 (0.02)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) - - 0.50 (94.52)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) - - 0.24 (46.60)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) - - 0.45 (142.11)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) - - 0.47 (77.46)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) - - 0.31 (29.73)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) - - 0.47 (109.81)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) - - 0.72 (132.60)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) - - 0.54 (87.49)
Likelihood Ratio 493, 254
Observations 4, 583, 419
Table notes on the next page.
33Notes for Table 8






− Rindex,i = θo +
L X
l=1
θlXil + i + ξi,
with pi the price that the dealer sells the bond for, p
∗
i the price that the dealer pays the seller for the bond, Xil for




and ξi is exponential distributed with parameters a0
QK
k=1 e
akZk, with Zik for k = 1,...,K conditioning variables.
The ﬁrst two columns report the parameter estimates and t-statistics in parentheses for the model with a0 = a1 =
... = aK = 0 and the second two columns report the parameter estimates and t-statistics in parentheses for the
unrestricted model.
34Table 9: Parameter Estimates of the Stochastic Frontier Model: Stratiﬁed by Rising vs Falling
Market, FIFO Sample
Rising Market Mixed Market Falling Market
Cost Function Parameters
Constant 49.30 (233.26) 52.30 (253.39) 61.35 (244.36)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ (0, .1) −26.34 (−215.12) −27.44 (−226.97) −27.57 (−191.84)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −4.35 (−20.75) −5.34 (−25.01) −5.83 (−22.49)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 1.58 (9.14) 1.54 (8.82) 0.85 (3.95)
Overnight × Par ∈ (0, .1) 7.19 (14.97) 16.01 (34.20) 27.56 (49.78)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 2.87 (4.61) 9.89 (16.78) 25.94 (34.13)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −37.97 (−80.24) −22.10 (−48.65) −13.03 (−21.69)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ (0, .1) −0.94 (−139.15) −1.01 (−153.99) −1.10 (−133.66)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −1.16 (−104.09) −1.33 (−117.46) −1.32 (−97.76)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −1.25 (−103.38) −1.52 (−123.75) −1.41 (−95.76)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 53.43 (85.39) 49.43 (81.77) 53.69 (74.24)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 32.19 (43.24) 34.92 (47.19) 34.97 (38.86)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.02 (0.04) 1.05 (2.31) 1.94 (3.40)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 18.36 (24.77) 14.64 (20.43) 14.42 (16.58)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 16.00 (19.33) 17.38 (20.40) 11.44 (10.92)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 18.79 (16.87) 16.45 (13.30) 16.92 (10.46)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 42.60 (41.61) 38.56 (38.95) 39.49 (33.37)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 50.75 (55.98) 50.46 (58.81) 45.87 (42.83)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 54.87 (63.02) 54.29 (65.16) 48.85 (44.84)
Maturity 2.28 (148.74) 2.68 (181.65) 2.53 (135.70)
Coupon −8.60 (−61.85) −9.64 (−72.25) −7.00 (−42.58)
Zero Coupon Bond −81.63 (−101.39) −87.50 (−112.22) −71.94 (−75.82)
Age 0.17 (7.33) 0.17 (7.52) 0.38 (13.91)
Transaction Frequency −14.99 (−41.09) −10.33 (−29.41) −13.74 (−31.36)
Issue Size −3.36 (−51.92) −3.83 (−60.52) −3.65 (−48.08)
State Volume 0.38 (1.82) 1.36 (6.66) 0.52 (2.17)
State Order Imbalance 2.07 (2.20) 2.81 (3.05) 5.36 (4.79)
State New Issues 13.80 (30.10) 13.73 (27.72) 15.76 (26.35)
Treasury Yield 6.32 (67.84) 5.36 (61.80) 7.13 (64.16)
Treasury Range 1.19 (14.01) 2.15 (27.13) 4.15 (47.45)
Revenue Bond −2.90 (−13.90) −2.58 (−12.65) −1.93 (−7.80)
Tax Revenue Bond 5.17 (11.95) 4.35 (10.06) 3.81 (7.37)
General Obligation Bond −4.30 (−7.73) −4.46 (−8.25) −3.90 (−5.92)
Guaranteed 10.85 (7.20) 12.97 (8.48) 6.44 (3.53)
Prerefunded −39.42 (−58.00) −39.29 (−60.32) −41.76 (−52.06)
Certiﬁcates of Partn 3.18 (7.05) 3.88 (8.92) 4.07 (7.65)
County Issuer 2.31 (11.00) 1.77 (8.70) 2.73 (10.96)
School District Issuer 7.06 (21.53) 5.44 (16.68) 6.33 (16.29)
Development Authority −2.89 (−7.33) −3.68 (−9.73) −3.58 (−7.64)
Financial Authority 0.67 (1.51) −0.71 (−1.64) 0.03 (0.05)
Housing Authority −9.33 (−7.95) −11.04 (−9.89) −13.95 (−9.86)
Sewer Authority 4.70 (10.28) 3.16 (7.09) 3.29 (6.07)
Utilities 6.68 (11.85) 7.12 (13.00) 3.97 (5.97)
Redevelopment 6.77 (8.14) 6.21 (7.71) 8.46 (8.70)
Improvement −1.75 (−4.80) −2.56 (−7.18) −2.36 (−5.47)
Facilities 2.63 (10.26) 1.32 (5.25) 2.28 (7.47)
Reﬁnancing 1.53 (7.85) 2.28 (12.00) 1.40 (6.03)
The table is continued on the next page.
35Table 9: Parameter Estimates of the Stochastic Frontier Model: Stratiﬁed by Rising vs Falling
Market, FIFO Sample (cont’d)
Rising Market Mixed Market Falling Market
Symmetric Error Distribution
Constant 98.52 (3941.42) 97.10 (3969.92) 100.40 (3404.11)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ (0, .1) −0.22 (−94.05) −0.21 (−95.11) −0.21 (−77.62)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.03 (4.59) 0.03 (3.83) 0.04 (5.14)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −0.09 (−19.68) −0.08 (−17.29) −0.08 (−14.09)
Overnight × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.27 (37.00) 0.25 (35.70) 0.28 (34.56)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 1.12 (68.34) 1.03 (65.14) 1.14 (58.22)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.94 (76.54) 0.87 (72.24) 0.95 (64.52)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.00 (69.39) 0.00 (75.69) 0.00 (60.56)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.00 (54.52) 0.00 (60.18) 0.00 (46.16)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.00 (60.91) 0.00 (67.80) 0.00 (50.29)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.20 (25.93) 0.18 (22.67) 0.18 (20.11)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.01 (0.37) 0.01 (0.41) 0.01 (0.40)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.10 (9.63) 0.10 (9.27) 0.07 (5.54)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.23 (27.23) 0.22 (26.64) 0.21 (21.59)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −0.12 (−7.26) −0.08 (−4.61) −0.11 (−5.42)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −0.11 (−4.44) −0.03 (−1.21) −0.03 (−0.93)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.37 (35.49) 0.36 (35.44) 0.33 (27.65)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −0.09 (−5.93) −0.10 (−6.52) −0.13 (−7.39)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −0.02 (−1.14) −0.04 (−2.35) −0.07 (−3.44)
Asymmetric Error Distribution
Constant 107.86 (2748.78) 108.31 (2869.15) 106.76 (2299.73)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ (0, .1) −0.22 (−147.04) −0.22 (−149.74) −0.21 (−115.85)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.1, .5) −0.35 (−96.72) −0.34 (−95.85) −0.34 (−79.22)
ln(Par) × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) −0.21 (−58.77) −0.20 (−56.03) −0.17 (−41.52)
Overnight × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.23 (43.57) 0.23 (45.83) 0.22 (36.50)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.07 (8.68) 0.08 (10.52) 0.04 (3.62)
Overnight × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.66 (77.39) 0.64 (76.37) 0.71 (69.67)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.00 (96.09) 0.00 (104.52) 0.00 (86.26)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.00 (71.72) 0.00 (83.28) 0.00 (65.02)
Inventory Duration × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.00 (95.71) 0.00 (107.49) 0.00 (78.20)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) −0.01 (−1.07) 0.02 (3.51) −0.02 (−2.68)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.52 (59.61) 0.50 (58.75) 0.47 (44.30)
Split × No Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.26 (29.31) 0.24 (28.43) 0.24 (23.37)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.44 (84.72) 0.44 (87.60) 0.46 (73.56)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.49 (49.29) 0.45 (45.56) 0.48 (39.02)
No Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.35 (21.86) 0.32 (18.99) 0.24 (11.05)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ (0, .1) 0.48 (67.99) 0.46 (67.06) 0.46 (54.88)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.1, .5) 0.74 (81.65) 0.71 (82.07) 0.71 (65.35)
Split × Interdealer × Par ∈ [.5, ∞) 0.60 (58.83) 0.55 (55.76) 0.46 (37.43)
Log-Likelihood −10, 383, 028 −11, 085, 270 −7, 727, 899
Observations 1, 630, 138 1, 740, 587 1, 212, 694
Table notes on the next page.
36Notes for Table 9
Table 9 reports parameter estimates for subsamples associated with rising, falling, or mixed interest rate environments.
The ﬁrst two columns report the parameter estimates and t-statistics in parentheses for the unrestricted model for
transactions initiated on days with rising bond prices. Rising markets are deﬁned as days t on which four points on
the yield curve (3 month, 5, 10, and 30 year terms) decrease between the close at t − 1 and t + 1. Mixed markets
are days on which the yield curve does not parallel shift (reported in columns three and four). Falling markets are
associated with upward shifts of the yield curve at all maturities. That is days t on which four points on the yield
curve (3 month, 5, 10, and 30 year terms) increase between the close at t−1 and t+1. Estimation results for falling
markets are reported in columns ﬁve and six.
37Table 10: Parameter Estimates of the Stochastic Frontier Model: Transparency, FIFO Sample
Par ∈ (0, .1) Par ∈ [.1, .5) Par ∈ [.5, ∞)
Cost Function Parameters
Oct ’00 - May ’02 −5.72 (−12.94) 5.75 (10.60) 0.19 (0.79)
May ’02 - Nov ’02 −6.02 (−10.44) 5.93 (8.14) −21.86 (−48.06)
Nov ’02 - Jun ’03 −5.12 (−8.58) 4.53 (6.10) −23.23 (−49.57)
Jun ’03 - Jan ’04 −7.62 (−12.53) 1.47 (1.98) −28.69 (−52.91)
ln(Par) −40.69 (−218.46) −9.41 (−29.13) 3.67 (42.59)
Overnight 17.86 (60.47) 12.32 (32.91) −14.75 (−45.98)
Inventory Duration −0.98 (−230.87) −1.19 (−169.99) −1.55 (−181.16)
Split × No Interdealer 49.11 (124.49) 31.24 (63.17) 4.76 (22.44)
No Split × Interdealer 16.86 (35.58) 8.44 (15.23) 31.07 (41.13)
Split × Interdealer 36.51 (57.55) 47.14 (78.25) 98.94 (100.00)
Maturity 5.59 (361.24) 2.53 (112.68) 0.86 (58.73)
Coupon −16.52 (−136.26) −6.91 (−40.14) −16.07 (−69.13)
Coupon Zero or Missing −83.61 (−118.20) −88.45 (−85.68) −104.09 (−76.34)
Age −0.03 (−1.37) −0.39 (−11.67) 0.36 (20.67)
Transaction Frequency −43.52 (−80.72) −18.09 (−30.90) 4.08 (19.18)
Issue Size −5.05 (−94.88) −9.00 (−95.92) −4.37 (−49.76)
State Volume −5.58 (−16.46) −2.77 (−6.12) −1.02 (−4.22)
State Order Imbalance 0.67 (0.71) −0.31 (−0.25) −3.26 (−4.88)
State New Issues 4.20 (7.95) 5.65 (8.02) 6.63 (17.36)
Treasury Yield 5.99 (49.55) 2.33 (14.94) −4.48 (−35.84)
Treasury Range 4.20 (52.38) 3.24 (31.00) 2.70 (40.54)
Symmetric Error Distribution
Constant 119.96 (2319.73) 84.83 (992.02) 80.20 (1275.73)
Oct ’00 - May ’02 −0.11 (−47.29) −0.15 (−29.70) −0.16 (−43.28)
May ’02 - Nov ’02 −0.06 (−20.25) −0.03 (−5.00) −0.10 (−21.29)
Nov ’02 - Jun ’03 −0.01 (−4.21) −0.01 (−2.32) −0.08 (−18.37)
Jun ’03 - Jan ’04 0.04 (14.07) 0.07 (12.21) 0.06 (12.36)
ln(Par) −0.11 (−95.83) 0.01 (1.61) −0.02 (−16.44)
Overnight 0.23 (119.32) 0.98 (158.43) 1.41 (198.25)
Inventory Duration 0.00 (234.29) 0.00 (183.12) 0.00 (205.08)
Split × No Interdealer 0.02 (9.06) 0.05 (10.82) 0.21 (66.54)
No Split × Interdealer 0.13 (50.19) −0.04 (−7.83) 0.25 (26.56)
Split × Interdealer 0.18 (56.34) 0.03 (5.41) 0.51 (120.89)
Asymmetric Error Distribution
Constant 109.97 (1336.31) 102.87 (827.62) 37.15 (383.61)
Oct ’00 - May ’02 0.00 (−0.26) 0.09 (15.07) 0.26 (28.35)
May ’02 - Nov ’02 −0.05 (−9.56) 0.12 (16.55) 0.54 (50.93)
Nov ’02 - Jun ’03 −0.06 (−12.86) 0.14 (19.56) 0.58 (56.62)
Jun ’03 - Jan ’04 −0.13 (−25.26) 0.02 (2.54) 0.62 (55.95)
ln(Par) −0.16 (−91.12) −0.22 (−54.42) −0.28 (−95.35)
Overnight 0.24 (68.56) 0.10 (19.98) 0.79 (94.20)
Inventory Duration 0.00 (157.26) 0.00 (110.49) 0.01 (189.45)
Split × No Interdealer −0.01 (−2.40) 0.45 (81.50) 0.26 (45.56)
No Split × Interdealer 0.54 (158.29) 0.41 (65.19) 0.15 (11.40)
Split × Interdealer 0.52 (112.49) 0.63 (109.65) 0.12 (17.96)
Observations 2, 839, 401 726, 352 656, 635
The table reports the parameter estimates and t-statistics in parentheses for the unrestricted model
for diﬀerent par ranges. The model includes ﬁxed eﬀects for regulatory changes in MSRB reporting
requirements, and for the state of issuance (not reported). In October 2000, May 2002, November
2002, and June 2003 the MSRB enacted regulation that gradually increased transparency in the
municipal bond market.
38Table 11: Parameter Estimates of the Stochastic Frontier Model: Availability of Daily Reports
Par ∈ (0, .1) Par ∈ [.1, .5) Par ∈ [.5, ∞)
Cost Function Parameters
Daily Report −1.70 (−1.75) −0.70 (−0.67) 2.74 (0.79)
Oct ’00 - May ’02 −22.72 (−13.54) −5.19 (−2.88) −37.38 (−1.12)
May ’02 - Nov ’02 −55.06 (−27.28) −38.90 (−16.84) −60.21 (−1.02)
Nov ’02 - Jun ’03 −67.72 (−31.57) −49.63 (−20.42) −76.56 (−0.98)
ln(Par) −37.52 (−61.36) −9.93 (−10.30) −0.40 (−0.37)
Overnight −5.60 (−5.45) −20.90 (−18.51) −30.03 (−4.25)
Inventory Duration −0.69 (−68.50) −0.93 (−65.23) −1.17 (−6.81)
Split × No Interdealer 51.14 (40.85) 43.75 (24.52) −1.66 (−2.37)
No Split × Interdealer 12.80 (7.56) −12.72 (−4.71) 18.94 (6.11)
Split × Interdealer 53.71 (31.23) 84.83 (40.68) 110.16 (9.46)
Maturity 5.18 (71.66) 3.63 (42.57) 1.67 (0.85)
Coupon −71.50 (−96.55) −44.19 (−39.31) −53.76 (−0.96)
Coupon Zero or Missing −449.42 (−110.44) −324.67 (−51.58) −313.30 (−1.00)
Age 0.72 (4.76) 0.46 (2.70) 0.77 (0.72)
Transaction Frequency −37.30 (−22.39) 0.72 (0.42) −0.05 (−0.08)
Issue Size −6.93 (−28.24) −10.52 (−23.49) −6.82 (−1.61)
State Volume −1.72 (−1.44) −0.17 (−0.12) 5.12 (1.30)
State Order Imbalance −2.92 (−0.91) −0.25 (−0.07) −8.88 (−1.12)
State New Issues 5.76 (3.14) 9.21 (4.19) 3.68 (1.03)
Treasury Yield 2.79 (4.10) −17.81 (−21.57) −26.84 (−0.90)
Treasury Range 2.49 (7.89) 5.40 (14.11) 1.87 (0.98)
Symmetric Error Distribution
Constant 143.94 (2271.00) 113.57 (1238.15) 84.40 (29.43)
Daily Report 0.09 (20.59) −0.03 (−4.93) −0.09 (−5.59)
Oct ’00 - May ’02 −0.21 (−34.36) −0.16 (−16.58) −0.26 (−4.51)
May ’02 - Nov ’02 −0.26 (−35.31) −0.18 (−15.01) −0.19 (−5.81)
Nov ’02 - Jun ’03 −0.25 (−34.61) −0.19 (−16.12) −0.22 (−13.14)
ln(Par) −0.06 (−19.26) −0.04 (−6.42) −0.07 (−2.78)
Overnight 0.28 (48.76) 0.67 (49.70) 1.02 (1.59)
Inventory Duration 0.00 (74.78) 0.00 (74.70) 0.00 (7.73)
Split × No Interdealer −0.09 (−12.80) 0.19 (16.07) 0.13 (2.07)
No Split × Interdealer 0.28 (46.19) 0.31 (25.41) 0.46 (8.19)
Split × Interdealer 0.14 (19.81) 0.26 (26.35) 0.48 (6.38)
Asymmetric Error Distribution
Constant 120.70 (1117.30) 104.94 (695.03) 42.29 (25.84)
Daily Report −0.01 (−1.16) −0.02 (−1.95) −0.06 (−1.09)
Oct ’00 - May ’02 0.04 (2.94) 0.16 (7.40) 2.17 (2.04)
May ’02 - Nov ’02 0.08 (5.04) 0.27 (11.47) 2.20 (1.94)
Nov ’02 - Jun ’03 0.14 (8.86) 0.32 (14.13) 2.37 (1.91)
ln(Par) −0.13 (−25.49) −0.15 (−13.60) −0.10 (−1.99)
Overnight 0.35 (30.57) 0.32 (19.48) 1.12 (2.05)
Inventory Duration 0.00 (49.92) 0.00 (46.77) 0.01 (32.21)
Split × No Interdealer −0.07 (−5.25) 0.34 (18.10) 0.14 (2.16)
No Split × Interdealer 0.39 (36.15) 0.60 (31.25) 0.14 (0.84)
Split × Interdealer 0.33 (26.69) 0.58 (37.16) 0.13 (0.32)
Observations 345, 189 128, 757 187, 509
Table 11 reports the parameter estimates and t-statistics in parentheses for the unrestricted model
for diﬀerent par ranges. The model includes ﬁxed eﬀects for inclusion of the bond issue in the
Daily Report during the last week, ﬁxed issuer eﬀects (not reported) and ﬁxed eﬀects for regulatory
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Figure 3: Distribution of net markups for diﬀerent transaction sizes. The distributions are estimated
using Epanechnikov kernels with the Silverman automatic bandwidth selection.
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psychology; education, and theology.  It also includes a school of translation and interpretation; an institute 
of architecture; seven interdisciplinary centers and six associated institutes. 
 
More than 13’000 students, the majority being foreigners, are enrolled in the various programs from the 
licence to high-level doctorates. A staff of more than 2’500 persons (professors, lecturers and assistants) is 
dedicated to the transmission and advancement of scientific knowledge through teaching as well as 
fundamental and applied research. The University of Geneva has been able to preserve the ancient European 
tradition of an academic community located in the heart of the city. This favors not only interaction between 
students, but also their integration in the population and in their participation of the particularly rich artistic 
and cultural life. http://www.unige.ch 
 
The University of Lausanne 
Founded as an academy in 1537, the University of Lausanne (UNIL) is a modern institution of higher 
education and advanced research.  Together with the neighboring Federal Polytechnic Institute of Lausanne, 
it comprises vast facilities and extends its influence beyond the city and the canton into regional, national, 
and international spheres. 
 
Lausanne is a comprehensive university composed of seven Schools and Faculties: religious studies; law; 
arts; social and political sciences; business; science and medicine. With its 9’000 students, it is a medium-
sized institution able to foster contact between students and professors as well as to encourage 
interdisciplinary work. The five humanities faculties and the science faculty are situated on the shores of 
Lake Leman in the Dorigny plains, a magnificent area of forest and fields that may have inspired the 
landscape depicted in Brueghel the Elder's masterpiece, the Harvesters.  The institutes and various centers of 
the School of Medicine are grouped around the hospitals in the center of Lausanne. The Institute of 
Biochemistry is located in Epalinges, in the northern hills overlooking the city. http://www.unil.ch 
 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies is a teaching and research institution devoted to the study of 
international relations at the graduate level. It was founded in 1927 by Professor William Rappard to 
contribute through scholarships to the experience of international co-operation which the establishment of 
the League of Nations in Geneva represented at that time. The Institute is a self-governing foundation 
closely connected with, but independent of, the University of Geneva. 
 
The Institute attempts to be both international and pluridisciplinary. The subjects in its curriculum, the 
composition of its teaching staff and the diversity of origin of its student body, confer upon it its 
international character.  Professors teaching at the Institute come from all regions of the world, and the 
approximately 650 students arrive from some 60 different countries. Its international character is further 
emphasized by the use of both English and French as working languages. Its pluralistic approach - which 
draws upon the methods of  economics, history, law, and political science - reflects its aim to provide a 
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